



4 August - Sea

- A submarine shelled and chased the Australian passenger liner Katoomba, bound from Fremantle to Adelaide, when she was some 200 miles S.S.E. of Esperance on 4th August. The attack began at 7.10 p.m. and the chase continued, with intermittent gunfire from the submarine, for three hours, when the liner's speed (16 knots) and return fire presumably caused the Japanese to break off the attack. Katoomba and her people were unhurt.
- Force "A" returned to Colombo on 4th August, and on that day the 4th Cruiser Squadron, with part of Force "A"—Formidable, *Nizam* and *Norman*—sailed for Kilindini to prepare for operations against Madagascar.
- From 4th August onwards Crutchley maintained radar watch for enemy reconnaissance aircraft.

4 August - Sea



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

303481

THE AUSTRALIAN CARGO VESSEL SS KATOOMBA. Coal fired steamship built in Belfast in 1913 for McIlwraith, McEacharn & Co.

4 August - Army

- **Kokoda Track**
- Kienzle then blazed a new trail back to Eora Creek on the 4th August and the point where it met the old track on the banks of the creek he called Templeton's Crossing.
- By that time the laying of telephone lines across the mountains to Deniki was just being completed;
- At Deniki the spirits of the Australians were rising once more. They were rested; their isolation was lessened by the completion of the telephone line on 4th August.
- Cameron arrived to take command of them the same day.
- **6th Division**
- The Brigades returning from Ceylon started disembarking at Melbourne on 4th August.



4 August - Air



- About this time Kenney (right) clarified his relationship with Sutherland (left).
- G.H.Q.'s orders for the S.W.P.A. share in the Guadalcanal operation included a page and a half of air operations details—the numbers and types of aircraft to be dispatched, the designation of units, even the times for take-off and the size of the bombs.
- Kenney promptly demanded that they be rescinded.
- When Sutherland "seemed to be getting a little antagonistic", he suggested that they see MacArthur, saying "I want to find out who is supposed to run this Air Force."
- The orders were rescinded without any appeal to the Supreme Commander.



4 August - Air

- **SWP**

- On 4th August Milne Bay suffered its first air raid.
 - Four Zeros and a dive bomber attacked No. 1 Strip with gunfire and succeeded in destroying one of 75 Squadron's aircraft on the ground.
 - Since the radar station was not yet in full service there was practically no warning, but 76 Squadron had eight Kittyhawks on patrol.
 - Several of the Kittyhawk pilots engaged the Zeros. Flight Lieutenant Ash, returning from patrol, intercepted and shot down the dive bomber which crashed into the jungle.
- Hudson A16-223, Flt Lt Milne, took off from Port Moresby at 06.53 to drop supplies at Kagi returning at 08.08. At 15.10 the same aircraft again piloted by Milne transported supplies and personnel to Wau, escorted by eight P400s.
- The CO of 39 Fighter Squadron, Maj. Jack Berry was flying a practice bombing mission off Moresby in a P39 when his bomb exploded directly under his aircraft, destroying the aircraft and killing him. 1 Lt Stephen David took over as acting CO.

- **SOPAC**


- 9 B17s of 11th Group bomb the airfield on Guadalcanal.

- **CBI**

- P-40's sweep Japanese HQ at Linchwan and bomb HQ buildings and barracks and strafe transports.

4 August - Air

- Aleutians
- 2 B-17's and 3 B-24's covered by 8 P-38's escort Navy tenders to Nazan Bay.
- 2 4-engine seaplane bombers and a possible third are downed near Atka by 2 of the P-38's, in the type's first aerial combat in any theater.
- Weather cancels bombing mission to Kiska.
- 1 LB-30 flies a photo mission



5 August - Sea

- At noon on 5th August, the Watchtower convoy was about 400 miles S. by W. of Guadalcanal. The weather was favouring the invaders, with much cumulus cloud and a surface haze.
- On Bougainville, to make certain that they were available when the Allied assault took place, Coastwatchers Read and Mason had been instructed to move inland clear of any danger, and to preserve radio silence until instructed to resume reporting.
- On 5th August they were directed to resume their lookout positions. Read and Mason were instructed to pass aircraft reports in plain language, and the American command was told the frequency on which these reports would be made.



Paul Mason (left) and Jack Read (right)
Coastwatchers


5 August

- Next day (5th August), Kienzle told the supply officer at Ilolo of his discovery and of the acute supply position and asked for air dropping to begin at Myola. That day an experimental drop was made.
- At this time no effective air dropping technique had been developed. Practically the only guidance was from pre-war New Guinea when supplies had sometimes been dropped to isolated parties. Stores were dropped enclosed in two, or more, sacks, the outer sack being considerably larger than the inner. While the inner one would usually burst on impact the outer one would sometimes hold and prevent the contents from scattering.
- But not much accuracy could be achieved and many of the bundles could not be found; even in those bundles which were picked up most of the contents might be damaged; and the types of materials which could be supplied were severely limited.
- Myola was quick to develop as a main base in the mountains.
- Despite this, however, there was still a long carry of two or three days forward to the front. Over that stage everything ammunition, rations, medical supplies, blankets—had to be transported by natives.
- To Kienzle, therefore, fell the task of establishing staging points and dumps at Templeton's Crossing, Eora Creek, Alola and Isurava. At each of these places Angau men were in charge of carriers and, for some time, of stores also.



5 August

- **New Guinea**
- On the 5th the only two aircraft available for supply work returned to Australia but Allied Air Force Headquarters stated that one was due to be stationed permanently at Moresby. Morris signalled tersely:
- Transport planes previously made available all returned to mainland Kanga and Maroubra personnel cannot be fully maintained by native carriers and latter will desert in large numbers if tracks subjected to air attack. Weather conditions over mountains usually difficult and planes have to stand by for long periods awaiting breaks. Procedure for obtaining transport planes outlined is too slow and has already cost us Kokoda. Consider two machines permanently based here is minimum requirement.
- Flt Lt Milne and Hudson A16-223 were again off at 06.00 on a supply dropping mission.
- **CBI**
- Japanese aircraft again attack US A/F at Kweilin. Notified well in advance by the Chinese warning net (previously set up under Gen Chennault while he was head of AVG), P-40's meet the Japanese over the target, shooting down 2, and another is downed by ground fire.



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

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6 August - Government

- In reply, on 6 August, to the Australian request of 30th July 1942 for assistance in equipping 73 squadrons as one of the conditions of leaving the 9th Division in the Middle East, Churchill referred to the assurances given by the United States Chiefs of Staff that adequate measures would be taken to ensure the safety of Australia and stated that as soon as strategic requirements were defined they would be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whose United Kingdom representatives had instructions to ensure that the interests of the Dominions were adequately safeguarded.



Combined Chiefs of Staff. British representatives from second from right. Portal CAS, Brooke Chairman and CIGS, Pound First Sea Lord, Mountbatten Chief of Combined Operations and Ismay Chief of Staff to Churchill.

Brooke's diary entry for 28 May included: "Then COS had Dr Evatt again for 45 minutes pleading that Australia should be crammed full of forces at the expense of all other fronts. However he left with no more than he had come!"

6 August - Sea

- On 6th August, as the Watchtower convoy approached its objective, the cloud cover deepened into heavy overcast and a damp mist which closely limited surface visibility.
- At noon the assault groups were about 60 miles west of Rennell Island steering north with the escorts at first degree of surface and anti-aircraft readiness.
- The carrier groups had proceeded to their own covering positions south of Guadalcanal.
- There was no sign of enemy aircraft or submarines, and no indication that the approach was observed.
- All previous attempts by US Naval task forces to get within bombing range of Rabaul had all been detected by the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft when they got this close.
- Now the enormous Watchtower convoy of 23 transports escorted by 53 warships, carrying 16,000 embarked marines and 35,000 crew, was hidden from aircraft and submarines by the heavy overcast and the mist.
- At 4.15 p.m. on the 6th the assault forces assumed approach positions.
- At 10.30 p.m. Squadron "Y" altered course to N.E. towards the north-west end of Guadalcanal, with Squadron "X" following suit half an hour later.
- About 03.00 in the morning of Friday, 7th August, the two groups' ways parted. Squadron "Y" stood on north-eastward to pass to the northward of Savo, and Squadron "X" hauled round to the south-eastward for the disembarkation area off Guadalcanal's north shore.

Marines Background

- The problem that confronted early steam navies was obtaining fuel. Sailing ships, could operate at sea almost indefinitely, putting in only to replenish food and water, readily available at any port of call. But sufficient coal to support large-scale steamship operations could be obtained only from well stocked bases and a fleet's operating radius became limited by the location of those bases.
- The Spanish-American War found the Navy wholly unprepared to cope with the advanced base problem. The Marine Corps promptly organized an expeditionary battalion for the seizure of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order to enable the U.S. Fleet to operate indefinitely in Caribbean waters.
- This unit landed in the target area on 10 June 1898, ten days before the first Army troops arrived off the coast of Cuba. The Marines quickly secured a beachhead and successfully defended it against a numerically superior enemy.
- *Joint Action of the Army and Navy*, a directive issued by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy in 1927, stated that the Marine Corps would provide and maintain forces "for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign."

Marines Background

- In November 1933, all classes at the Marine Corps Schools were suspended, and both the faculty and students set to work to write a manual setting out in detail the doctrines and techniques to be followed in landing operations.
- Under the title, Tentative Manual for Landing Operations it was issued in January 1934.
- The Navy accepted it as official doctrine in 1938 under the title of Fleet Training Publication 167, and in 1941 the War Department put the Navy text between Army covers and issued it as Field Manual 31-5.
- The amphibious doctrine was largely theory when it was first promulgated in 1934. To put theory into practice, major landing exercises were held by the Marine Corps each winter from 1935 through 1941 in conjunction with fleet exercises in the Caribbean, or on the California coast.
- An exercise on a much larger scale than any previously attempted was held at the newly acquired Marine Corps base at New River, North Carolina, in the summer of 1941. These fleet landing exercises provided the practical experience by which details of landing operations were hammered out.



ARMY LIGHT TANK is unloaded from its landing craft during joint Army-Marine amphibious exercises at New River, N. C. in August 1941. (SG 125129)

Marines Background

- Two months before Hitler's armies launched their *Blitzkrieg*, Marine Corps strength stood at 19,432.
- Mobilization in November 1940 of the entire Marine Corps Reserve permitted the activation on 1 February 1941 of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions and the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW).
- The strength of the 1st Division on 30 November 1941 was only 8,918.
- The Division's ranks, rapidly swelled to full strength of 16,000, divided into two categories.
- Young, mostly under twenty, post Pearl Harbor enlistees formed the vast majority.
 - Some joined because, as the recruiting posters boasted, the marines would be the first to fight.
 - None pinned on the globe and anchor seeking safety or comfort.



Marines Background

- The other group was by contrast small in number, but like a drop of dye in a gallon of water they gave the Division an unmistakable hue.
- One of their officers, Lt Col Samuel Griffith, described them:
- “. . . first sergeants yanked off “planks” in navy yards, sergeants from recruiting duty, gunnery sergeants who had fought in France, perennial privates with disciplinary records a yard long. These were the professionals, the “Old Breed” of the United States Marines.
- Many had fought “Cacos” in Haiti, “bandidos” in Nicaragua, and French, English, Italian and American soldiers and sailors in every bar in Shanghai, Manila, Tsingtao, Tientsin and Peking.
- They were inveterate gamblers and accomplished scroungers, who drank hair tonic in preference to post exchange beer . . . Many dipped snuff, smoked rank cigars or chewed tobacco (cigarettes were for women and children). . . they could live on jerked goat, the strong black coffee they called “boiler compound” and hash cooked in a tin hat.

Marines Background

- Many wore expert badges with bars for proficiency in rifle, pistol, machine gun, hand grenade, auto-rifle, mortar and bayonet.
- They knew their weapons and they knew their tactics.
- They knew they were tough and they knew they were good.
- There were enough of them to leaven the Division and to impart to the thousands of younger men a share of both the unique spirit which animated them and the skills they possessed”.



BANDIT-HUNTING PATROL in Nicaragua in 1929 typifies Marine activities between the World Wars when the Corps served as a Caribbean riot squad. (USMC 515283)

6 August – New Guinea

- On the 1st August it had been decided that the 7th Division A.I.F. should go to New Guinea, to reinforce New Guinea Force, and the first elements left Brisbane on the 6th August.
- At Eora Creek on 6th August Captain Vernon, who had been sent to act as a medical officer to all the carriers on the Kokoda track noted:
 - The condition of our carriers at Eora Creek caused me more concern than that of the wounded. . . . Overwork, overloading (principally by soldiers who dumped their packs and even rifles on top of the carriers' own burdens), exposure, cold and underfeeding were the common lot. Every evening scores of carriers came in, slung their loads down and lay exhausted on the ground; the immediate prospect before them was grim, a meal that consisted only of rice and none too much of that, and a night of shivering discomfort for most as there were only enough blankets to issue one to every two men.

6 August - Kokoda

- When Captain Bidstrup, with the remainder of his "D" Company, arrived at Deniki on the afternoon of the 6th August, all companies of the 39th Battalion were represented in the Deniki-Isurava area and the total strength was 464 men; there were also 43 of the Papuan Infantry Battalion and a small group of Angau leaders with 14 native police. Cameron's plans for an attack on Kokoda—where it was thought there were 300-500 Japanese—were well advanced.



6 August - Air

- **SWP**
- Six medium bombers (B-26) attacked Lae. Seven medium bombers (B-25) attacked Salamaua.
- One DC2 took off from Moresby at 06.43 to drop supplies at Kagi.
- **CBI**
- B-25s bomb Tien Ho A/F, causing heavy damage to the runways and destroying several parked airplanes.
- **Aleutians**
- 3 B-24's, 2 B-17's, and 10 P-38s. provide air coverage for Navy tenders to Nazan Bay. Photo rcn is flown over Attu.



US Army Air Forces Martin B-26 Marauder

Carrier Operations

- American carriers were operated with many more aircraft than would fit in the hanger.
- Straight decked carriers like the Enterprise needed to clear a long enough take off run forward before aircraft could take off. Length depending on aircraft type and loading.
- They had to clear a long stretch of deck aft before aircraft could land.
- This required respotting of aircraft frequently during intensive operations.
- Carriers needed to steam into the wind at high speed during flight operations. Extensive flight operations resulted in the task force moving off station.



USS Enterprise CV6

Carrier Operations

- Saratoga and Enterprise's air groups consisted of 36 SBD dive bombers, 15 TBF torpedo bombers and 36 Wildcat fighters. Wasp, a slightly smaller ship, had 30 fighters 30 dive bombers and 10 TBFs.
- The complement of fighters had been increased from 18 to 27 following the introduction of the F4F-4 version of the Wildcat with folding wings.
 - This version had been developed originally for a Royal Navy requirement, vigorously pushed along by Churchill, and was adopted by the USN to increase the complement of fighters that could be carried and in the interest of economies of scale and efficient production.
 - The British had specified six 0.5 inch machine guns, two more than the earlier F4F-3 Wildcat and the number of rounds per gun had been reduced to partially offset the weight of the additional guns.
 - The additional weight of the wing folding mechanism and the additional guns degraded the performance, particularly the rate of climb, which generated considerable unhappiness among the pilots.
- Following experience at Coral Sea and Midway the fighter complement was increased again to 36.
- After 8 months of continuous war operations and two major battles the surviving aircrew were battlewise but tired. 74 pilots from Enterprise and Yorktown air groups were sent home on leave then posted to training schools or to new squadrons being formed.
 - The US Navy would have numerous well trained air groups in 1943 but
 - the carrier pilots approaching Guadalcanal were not as experienced as those who had fought in the Coral Sea and at Midway

Carrier Operations



A U.S. Navy Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter in early 1942.



One of the main features of the F4F-4 were the *Sto-Wing*-design folding wings, a Grumman patented design.

Carrier Operations



TBF Avenger dropping a torpedo
Max speed 275 mph
1 torpedo or 2,000 lb bombs carried internally.
Strike radius c 300 miles



Douglas SBD (Scout Bomber) Dauntless
Dive bomber
Max speed 255 mph
Strike radius 325 miles with 500 lb bomb load
250 miles with 1,000 lb bombload

Carrier Operations



Douglas TBD-1 *Devastator* of Torpedo Squadron Six
Max speed 206 mph



TBF Avenger dropping a torpedo
Max speed 275 mph

The torpedo squadrons had been rebuilt with Avengers after the Devastators had been massacred at Midway.

Fighter Direction

- In 1941 the carriers had been equipped with CXAM-1 model radars, which would detect and display the bearing and range of aircraft roughly within an 80 mile radius.
 - They gave no direct information about altitude but because the radar waves were line of sight, targets at high altitude could be detected further out than those at lower altitude
- The radar did not give a visual display of the situation.
 - Bearing and range had to be manually entered on a 360 degree polar plot.
 - The flight path of a contact emerged from a series of position plots on the chart.
- An unidentified contact or “bogey” having been detected and plotted the FDO (Fighter Direction Officer) gave course, speed and altitude orders to selected fighter elements to bring the fighters into visual contact ahead of the bogey.
- Handicapping the FDO’s efforts was the primitive nature of fighter radios and the IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) gear.
 - The radios were only medium high frequency which risked enemy monitoring. The FDO had to hold his radio traffic to a minimum for fear of revealing his position to the enemy.
 - Not all aircraft had IFF as yet. The absence or malfunction of IFF meant that the FD plot was often swamped with “bogey”.
- The absence of fixed landmarks at sea and the fact that the carriers were moving and frequently changed course during air operations made the tasks of both FDO and fighter pilot more complex than in land based air defence.

7 August - Sea

- Ships' companies slept at their stations in first degree of readiness in the earlier stages of the night. In Australia, the bugle sounded the call to "action stations" at **2.45 a.m.** on the 7th.
- South west of the island the three carriers feverishly prepared the first strike wave planes on blacked out flight decks. The plan called for simultaneous dawn attacks by ninety three aircraft.
- Aircrews manned planes around 05.00, as idling engines dotted the decks with bright blue exhaust flames.
- Promptly at 05.30, 95 miles south west of Tulagi, the carriers turned into the wind and at 05.35 Enterprise launched the first plane and all the others followed. Tail lights and aircraft exhaust appeared all round the ships.
- Taking off from the Saratoga, Ens William Bell stalled his SBD and disappeared in the dark waters.
- In the darkness there was confusion in the forming up process but enough planes got to the right place to carry out the planned attacks.




7 August - Sea

- After launching the dawn strikes the carriers settled into the routine dictated by the OpPlan's intricate schedule. They flew Carrier Combat Air Patrol (CV CAP), Screen Combat Air Patrol (SCAP), ground support, search and anti-submarine Inner Air Patrol (IAP). Deck crews respotted planes several times an hour. The task force generally held a south easterly course. Light winds forced many 25 knot spurts that consumed fuel oil at prodigious rates.
- The CV CAP comprised 16 to 24 fighters controlled by Lt Hank Rowe the Red Base FDO on Enterprise. Another morning mishap occurred at 06.17 when on his way up deck, the wind lofted Ens Charles Eichenberger's right wing so that his left wing scraped the deck and struck a gun mount. It flipped the Wildcat on its back and spun it overboard. Eichenberger looked like a goner but the water pouring into the cockpit revived him and he escaped the sinking plane and was picked up by the plane guard, destroyer Phelps, with only minor (but painful) injuries.
- The fighters also flew SCAP between Guadalcanal and Tulagi, 60 miles or more away from the carriers, which reduced the time they could spend on station. The fighters on station were controlled by the Black Base FDO Lt Robert Bruning, on the cruiser Chicago.

7 August - Sea

- Lt Cdr Courtney Shands had assembled 11 Wildcats of his VF 71 tasked to seek and destroy anything in Tulagi Harbour that might interfere with the landings.
- They barrelled into the harbour at 50 feet before sun up.
- Sighting dark objects on the water they turned sharply to strafe them.
- The targets sprouted bright flames and illuminated a number of four engine flying boats, which were also strafed leaving four pyres burning brightly on the water.
- Lt Wright and his wing man found another nest of flying boats off Tanambogo's north coast and torched seven targets, four flying boats and three tenders or barges.
- Continuing round the shore in the growing light Shands found a line of six float plane fighters and torched them also.



Nakajima A6M2-N, Allied reporting name "Mavis"



Nakajima A6M2-N, Allied reporting name "Rufe"

7 August - Sea

- Quincy, with the responsibility of dealing with the enemy guns, opened fire at 6.13.
- Simultaneously the sky became noisy with the engines of Admiral Fletcher's carrier-borne aircraft sweeping in to their targets, and with the cracking of their gunfire and the bursting of bombs in the Gavutu-Tulagi area and on Guadalcanal. Some 36 fighters and 48 dive bombers were engaged on various missions.
- At 6.23 *Australia* fired three salvos of 8-inch at a beach village between Lunga and Tenaru. The sun rose at 6.33 and revealed the coastline and illuminated jungle-covered mountains rising to 8,000 feet in the interior. Fourteen minutes later the X Group transports reached their disembarkation area off Lunga Point, 20 miles E.S.E. of Cape Esperance. There they remained under way but stopped, outside the 100 fathom line.
- Screening groups took up their positions—an outer arc of destroyers, with the cruisers between them and the transports. Thus both cruisers and transports had an anti-submarine screen, and attacking aircraft would have to pass two outer circles of gunfire before reaching the transports.
- On the Guadalcanal side the first landing boats were in the water by 6.53 a.m., and by 8 a.m. the first waves of boats were forming up off the beach between Lunga Point and Tagoma about nine miles east.
- At 8 a.m. depth-charge attacks were carried out on a submarine repeatedly sighted by San Juan and several destroyers in the Tulagi area.
- At 9 a.m. Quincy, *Vincennes*, *Astoria*, and *Dewey*, *Hull*, *Ellet* and *Wilson*, which had been bombarding targets along the coast, carried out an intensive bombardment of the landing beaches and vicinity, and a few minutes later the first wave landed on Guadalcanal without opposition. The second wave landed at 9.30, and boats then began a regular ferry service between ships and shore.

7 August - Sea


- At Tulagi the first landing, on the southwestern side of the small island was, a little before **08:00**. It followed an intensive bombardment by the Fire Support Group—San Juan and destroyers Monssen and Buchanan—and was unopposed. The second wave landed a few minutes after the first.
- The carriers provided a steady stream of ground support flights to bomb and strafe strong points hindering the Marines advance.
- On the Tulagi side Lt Cdr Robert Strickler's Purple Base on board the transport Neville controlled the ground support flights.
- Lt Cdr William Townsend's Orange Base directed ground support against Guadalcanal from Turner's flagship McCawley.



TULAGI ISLAND, framed against the background of the larger Florida Island, is fire-swept from the hits scored by American carrier dive bombers. (USN 11649)

7 August – Landings Tulagi


- At **0740** (7th August), 20 minutes before H-hour, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, under command of Captain Crane, landed on **Florida near Haleta** to protect the left flank of the Tulagi Force.
- The landing was unopposed, although enemy troops had been reported in position there on 25 July.
- Crane reached his objective within 40 minutes.
- The 252 officers and men went ashore in eight landing boats and were guided to their objective by one of the several Australians on duty with the division.



The remainder of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hill) made a similar security landing at **Florida's Halavo** Peninsula near Gavutu and Tanambogo. The craft drew some fire from Gavutu but there were no casualties, and no enemy forces were encountered on the peninsula.

7 August – Landings Tulagi

- The main landing at Tulagi was at 08.00. Not a single landing craft of the first wave was able to set its passengers directly ashore.
- All of them hung up on coral formations at distances from 30 to well over 100 yards from the beach line, and the assault personnel of raider Companies B and D waded ashore against no opposition, through water initially from waist to armpit deep, sometimes slipping and tearing cloth and flesh on the spiny coral heads.
- The enemy defense forces, concentrated in the south eastern third of the island, realized that an all-out assault was underway.



Between 0725 and 0749, the *Tulagi Communication Base* notified Rabaul:

that Tulagi was under bombardment,
that the landings had begun, and
that the senders were destroying all equipment immediately.

At 0800 the Japanese messages said shells were falling near the radio installation. Ten minutes later, the final message went out: "Enemy troop strength is overwhelming. We will defend to the last man."

For many hours these messages provided Nimitz his only information on Allied progress.


- Unlike their comrades on Guadalcanal, the troops landing on Tulagi travelled light. “Don’t worry about the food” Lt Col Merritt Edson told one of his company commanders. “There’s plenty there. Japs eat, too. All you have to do is get it.”
- Foreign duty as operations officer with the 4th Marines in Shanghai, China from 1937 to 1939, had enabled Edson to observe closely Japanese military operations.



Edson in Shanghai, Japanese mounted officer in background.

7 August – Landings Tulagi


- Companies B and D had reached the beach, and the landing craft carrying raider Companies A and C now began to hang up on the coral.
- Assaulting, Marines crossed the beach and moved up the face of a steep, heavily wooded coral slope, the southwestern portion of the 350-foot ridge that forms an almost unbroken wall along the island's entire length.
- Major Lloyd Nickerson's Company B pushed on to the far coast of the island where it captured, without opposition, the native village of **Sasapi**.
- This company then swung to the right, and, tying in with Major Chambers' Company D which had gained the high ground, began moving southeast.



The advance of these two companies was steady and without opposition until Company B reached **Carpenter's Wharf**, halfway down the east shore of the island, where it encountered a series of enemy outposts.

7 August – Landings Guadalcanal

- There still were no signs of activity around Lunga at **0859**, 11 minutes before H-hour, when an observation plane from the *Astoria* reported that no Japanese could be seen in that area.
- The 5th Marines (less 2d Battalion) crossed its line of departure and moved into the 5,000-yard approach to the beach.
- Naval gunfire lifted inland as the craft neared the shore, and minutes later, at **0910**, the assault wave hit the beach on a **1,600 yard front** and pushed into the sparse jungle growth beyond.
- With 1st Battalion on the right (west.) and 3d Battalion on the left, the beach-head expanded rapidly against no opposition.
- A perimeter some 600 yards inland soon established a hasty defense. The line anchored on the west, at the Tenaru River, on the east at the Tenavatu River, and reached on the south an east-west branch of the Tenaru.



Prepared under the direction of the
Commander Combat Team No. 5; 1942.
From Special Sketch submitted, and
controlled by Map: North Coast of
Guadalcanal Island, R.F. 1:95,040;
14 July, 1942.

Scale R.F. 1:95,040 Natural Scale 1:108,643
0 1 2 3 4 5
Yards Statute Miles

Cartographic & Reproduction
Unit, Combat Team No. 5
1242


SPECIAL NOTE: This map was reproduced from Special Sketch Map drawn from the information supplied by a man thoroughly familiar with the terrain shown. It is an approximate pictorial representation drawn from this person's memory. It is not to be construed as being an accurate map.

7 August - Sea

- At **10.45** on 7 August the Allied ships off Tulagi and Guadalcanal heard the voice of Coastwatcher Mason in southern Bougainville, 320 miles North West of Guadalcanal: "From STO. Twenty-four bombers headed yours." On Canberra the bosun's mate piped over the loud speakers: "The ship will be attacked at noon by twenty four torpedo bombers. Hands will pipe to dinner at eleven o'clock."
- Twenty-five minutes later, having traversed the alternative channel through Port Moresby, Townsville, and Canberra, the warning was heard throughout the Pacific in the far-reaching radio voice of Pearl Harbour.
- Simultaneously with the receipt of Mason's original warning, Admiral Crutchley received an Intelligence report from South Pacific command that enemy submarines were on the move.
- Fighters had been flying ground support strafing sorties. Admiral Noyes, in tactical command of the air operations, now cancelled fighter ground support missions after 12.00.


7 August - Sea

- The Burns Philp ship, Mamutu (300 tons), was en route from Port Moresby to Daru, approximately 250 miles West of Moresby on the Papuan coast, with a crew of 39 and 103 passengers.
- At **11.10 a.m.** on the 7th (of August), when about two-thirds of the way across the gulf, she reported by radio that she was being attacked by a submarine.
- The submarine sank the ship by gunfire then cruised among the survivors in the water—men, women, and children—and machine-gunned them.
- Survivors were later seen, boatless, in the water, and rafts were dropped by Allied aircraft.
- Flying boat A18-11 crashed while attempting to rescue survivors.



7 August – Landings Guadalcanal

- At **1115** the 1st Marines moved through the hasty perimeter of the 5th Marines and struck out southwest toward Mount Austen, the "Grassy Knoll." Cates put his regiment across the Tenaru at an engineer bridge supported by an amphibian tractor, and the 1st Marines progressed slowly into the thickening jungle.
- Behind, to extend the beachhead, 1/5 crossed the mouth of the Tenaru at **1330** and moved toward the Ilu.
- Neither advance encountered enemy resistance.



Prepared under the direction of the
Commander Combat Team No. 5; 1942.
From Special Sketch submitted, and
controlled by Map; North Coast of
Guadalcanal Island, R.F. 1:95,040;
14 July, 1942.


Scale R.F. 1:95,040 Natural Scale 1:108,643
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
7 August – Landings Tulagi

- Meanwhile additional raiders had landed on Tulagi. Captain Walt's Company A, landing to follow the leading companies, swung right atop the ridge spine, and tied in on the left with Company D.
- Major Bailey's Company C also swung right, tied its left flank to Company A, and echeloned itself to the right rear to the beach.
- Spread out across the island, the raiders swept southeast against little opposition until **Phase Line A**, from the high ground northwest of Hill 281 to Carpenter's Wharf, was reached at **1120**.
- Here Major Chambers was wounded by mortar fire, and Captain Sperling assumed command of Company D.



7 August – Landings Gavutu

- **Gavutu** and **Tanambogo** are two islets, each dominated by a low, precipitous central hill of coral, joined by a 500 yard causeway.
- There were not sufficient craft for simultaneous landings, and the hour of assault was established in General Vandegrift's Operation order as H-plus four hours.
- So at **12.00** four hours after the raider landing on Tulagi, the parachute battalion made its frontal assault in the face of fire from an alerted garrison which was supported by fires from a flanking position.



7 August – Landings Gavutu


- The cruiser *San Juan*'s fire support mission—280 rounds of (6-inch fire in four minutes)—and the *Wasp*'s dive-bombers caused heavy damage to the enemy installations, but this destruction actually worked to the disadvantage of the parachutists in one instance.
- The unit intended to land on a seaplane ramp from which the beach could be easily reached, but the ramp had been reduced to an unusable mass of rubble. Observing this, the landing wave commanders altered course slightly to the north where craft became even more vulnerable to flanking fire.



TANAMBOGO AND GAVUTU ISLANDS photographed immediately after a pre-landing strike by USS Enterprise planes; Gavutu is at the left across the causeway. (USN 11034)


7 August – Landings Gavutu

- Part of the troops, scrambling over a concrete pier that jutted four feet out of the water, were exposed to fire from both islands.
- Company A, the first wave, got ashore without casualties to work inland against no serious opposition.
- The four boats carrying Company B and the final wave, with Company C and miscellaneous attachments, came under fire as they neared the island.
- The landing succeeded, however, and Company B, moving left and working toward Gavutu's southern end, gained some protection from enemy fire and continued to attack.



7 August

- 16 carrier-borne fighter aircraft were concentrated for defence of the amphibious forces under the direction of the fighter direction group in Chicago at 12.30.
- Soon after 12.30 Chicago's radar showed a large bogey and Bruning directed Lt Lou Bauer's six Wildcats out at 310 degrees at 8,000 feet to intercept.
- About 13.00 Bauer heard orders to steer 205 degrees, that is south east back towards the carriers.
- Requesting a repeat he again heard 205 degrees. When he reached the carriers Red Base told him to orbit.
- Bauers departure left the air defense of TF62 to 8 wildcats patrolling at 12,000 feet. Bruning had them at angels 12 because of a thick cloud layer that extended above 13,000 feet.
- Just after 13.00 Bruning vectored them out on 310 degrees angels 12.
- At 13.15 Southerland leading four wildcats suddenly saw 27 Bettys descend through the clouds within 500 yards of his left wing.




Mitsubishi G4M Allied reporting name Betty

- Southerland turned to harass the lead division of bombers with snap bursts but the other three Wildcats of his division were bounced by escorting Zeros before they could reach the bombers.
- Ens Robert Price and Lt Charles Tabberer were shot down and posted MIA, Ens Donald Innes had 49 holes punched in his Wildcat before he could duck into a cloud but claimed a Zero damaged.
- Southerland claimed two bombers shot down but was then shot down himself but parachuted safely.

7 August

- At **1.15 p.m.** the ships heard the "Tally Ho" on the fighter direction channel as defending fighters intercepted the enemy aircraft about 15 miles west of Savo Island.
- The four Wildcats lead by Lt Brown arrived just after Southerland. Brown sent Lt Holt and Ens Daly after the bombers while he and Ens Blair, his wing man, attempted to hold off the Zeros.
- Holt was shot down and posted MIA, Daly claimed two bombers shot down before being shot down in flames and parachuting into the sea badly burned. Brown claimed a Zero damaged before being wounded in the hip and Blair claimed a bomber damaged.



Mitsubishi G4M Allied reporting name Betty

- About eighteen bombers got through the fighter screen and attacked the Guadalcanal group coming over in tight formation supported by nine Zero fighters.
- They were engaged by all ships with gunfire at **1.23 p.m.** The leader of the enemy formation signalled "bomb release" with a bright light, and a simultaneous pattern-bombing attack resulted in all bombs falling to the N.W. of the transports and clear of the screening ships.

7 August

- By 13.30 the Zeros had knocked all the 8 SCAP Wildcats out of action but 18 more Wildcats had been dispatched by Red Base in pursuit of the withdrawing Japanese.
- The Red 3 division lead by Lt Gay were first to overtake and attack the bombers. They claimed 1 bomber shot down, 2 probables and 2 damaged before the Zero escort intervened.
- Mach Achten was so badly damaged by the Zeros he had to ditch. The other three were driven away from the bombers but survived to return to the carriers.
- Next in pursuit were the 6 Wildcats of Red 5 lead by Lt Gordon Firebaugh. Sighting the bombers, ahead but moving fast, Firebaugh requested Bruning's approval to pursue beyond the 35 mile limit. Well after 14.00 nearly 150 miles from the task force they caught the bombers.
- Firebaugh sent Mach Warden and Rad Elec Rhodes with their sections to attack the bombers while he and his wing man, AP1c Stephenson, dealt with 3 escort Zeros.



Mitsubishi A6M Zero

7 August

- As Firebaugh's section rolled in to attack, the Zeros instantly swung left and climbed steeply. Gaining altitude astonishingly fast the three Zeros met Firebaugh halfway. To his left Stephenson's F4F fell into a 45 degree dive and plunged straight into the water.
- The other two Red 5 sections claimed two bombers shot down before the escort Zeros returned. In the resulting melee they claimed a Zero shot down and another damaged.
- Mach Warden had his engine seize and had to ditch and
- Firebaugh was shot down in flames, suffered severe burns and parachuted into the sea.



Mitsubishi A6M Zero


- On Santa Isabel Coastwatcher Kuper saw two Wildcats and two Zeros go into the water.

7 August

- During the air battles the carriers labored to provide all available Wildcats while still providing scheduled ground support and search flights.
- During the frantic CAP launchings numerous planes, including battle survivors, awaited open flight decks. In worst shape, Pete Brown, wounded in the hip by an incendiary, nearly fainted from loss of blood, but kept himself awake with a phial of ammonia. When the Sara's deck came free he painfully cranked down the landing gear and started in without flaps. Coached by the LSO Lt Godwin, he landed safely, lifted himself out onto the wing and collapsed.
- On the downwind leg of his landing approach Lt Wright had his electric propeller control lock in full high pitch. He poured on the power but could not stay aloft very long. At 14.38 he stalled and spun in from 50 feet. An improvised chest belt saved him from injury and the plane guard destroyer picked him up.
- A minute later Fred Hamilton suffered serious head injuries when his F4F flipped over while landing on Wasp. F23 was a total loss, soon pushed over the side.
- By 15.00 there were 15 Wildcats back on SCAP in four flights.

7 August

- Scoop Vorse circled at 11,000 feet over the western flank of group X-ray, with three Wildcats. Suddenly 3 dive bombers appeared not far below. He abruptly rolled into an attack. His wing men failed to keep contact.
- At 14.57 a lookout on Mugford, lying on his back on the roof of No 2 five inch turret saw two dive bombers with fixed landing gear emerge out of a cloud astern.
- “Planes! They’ve got wheels.” he yelled at the bridge.
- They attacked and obtained one hit on *Mugford* the most westerly screening destroyer, *which* killed 22 men, including 14 blown overboard, but did little damage to the ship.




The **Aichi D3A Type 99 Dive Bomber** (Allied reporting name "**Val**")

- Scoop stayed with the third dive bomber, smoking but showing no flame it plunged straight into the water.

7 August

- At **15:00** ten dive bombers were sighted near Cape Esperance, almost coincidentally with a report on the Fighter Direction of 10 enemy bombers over Guadalcanal.
- Three other SCAP flights pursued them and headed them off from the transports. They attacked the nearest ship, the destroyer Dewey, and scored a near miss but no hits.
- The fighters claimed a total of 14 dive bombers shot down.




The **Aichi D3A Type 99 Dive Bomber** (Allied reporting name "**Val**")

- The presence of relatively short range dive bombers raised concerns about the possible presence of Japanese carriers and Noyes diverted an SBD strike to a search to the east with negative results.

7 August – Landings Tulagi

- By this time Colonel Edson, commanding the 1st Raider Battalion, was ashore. Confronting him was the more thickly settled portion of the island where the British governmental activities had centered.
- After directing a preparatory fire of infantry weapons into the area to their front, the raiders moved out toward the high ground beyond the saddle.
- Company C, on the right flank of the attack, drew fire almost immediately from Hill 208, a knob forward of the ridge that had just been cleared. The bulk of the Japanese resistance concentrated in the seaward face of the high ground, and Company C was caught by fire from enemy infantry weapons as it tried to pass between the hill and the beach.
- The raider company then turned its attack toward the hill and fought for nearly an hour before the Japanese positions were silenced.



7 August – Landings Tulagi

- Two naval gunfire liaison parties were in Edson's CP with their radios. When the other raider companies came under fire from Hill 281 while Company C fought against Hill 208, Edson put these naval gunfire teams to work.
- The San. Juan fired a seven-minute, 280-round concentration of 5-inch shells onto Hill 281. When it lifted the raiders advanced with a steady pressure against the enemy.



USS San Juan (CL 54) crew at general quarters at sea, circa 1942. Looking aft. 1.1" quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun mount in left center, 5"/38 guns beyond.

7 August – Landings Tulagi


- Four hours later, at **1625**, Edson notified Rupertus that 500 enemy had broken contact with his force and had withdrawn into the south eastern ridge.



Brigadier General Rupertus (center) supervises the assaults on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo from his command ship on 7 or 8 August. In the background are landing craft and a U.S. destroyer.


7 August – Landings Tulagi

- The advance continued slowly until dusk. Then all battalion elements went into position for the night. The positions extended along high ground and listening posts were established.




7 August – Landings Gavutu

- Pinned down on the beach under heavy fire, the other companies made no advances until Company B gained high ground from which its fire assisted in getting the attack off the beach. Hill 148, Gavutu's high ground, was plastered by naval guns and assaulted on the east and southeast.
- By 1430, Major Miller, who had succeeded the wounded Major Williams in command, controlled most of the island.
- Partially defiladed positions on Hill 148's west-southwestern slopes, however, still were active, and enemy emplacements there and on Tanambogo threatened further advance. Miller requested reinforcements to complete the capture of both islands.
- In anticipation of their arrival, Miller also requested an air strike and naval gunfire on Tanambogo, and Wasp planes furnished a 10 minute strike while Buchanan and Monssen, in position south of Gavutu, fired over that island and subjected the exposed faces of the hill on Tanambogo to an intense concentration of 5-inch shells.




7 August – Landings Gavutu

- By this time all forces available to General Rupertus had been committed, but since Captain Crane's Company B (1/2) had met no opposition on Florida near Tulagi, this unit was ordered to report to Miller. The message reached the company just as landing craft arrived to withdraw the Marines from their Florida beach.
- Embarked in six landing craft, the company arrived at Gavutu at about 1800, and Miller directed Crane to land on Tanambogo and seize that island.




7 August – Landings Gavutu

- Told that, only a few snipers held the island, Crane guided his overcrowded craft around the east shore of Tanambogo according to directions provided by Flight Lieutenant Spencer, RAAF, and under cover of darkness attempted a landing on a small pier on the northeastern tip of the island.
- The first boat landed without incident and the men deployed along the beach; but as the second boat discharged its men a shell from the fire support ships ignited a fuel dump, and the resulting glare lighted the landing area and exposed the Marines.
- The enemy opened up immediately, taking all boats under rifle and machine-gun fire. Casualties mounted among the Marines ashore and still afloat, but the boat crews, being exposed, suffered most heavily. One crew was completely wiped out and a Marine took control of the craft.
- The reinforcing machine-gun platoon in the second boat managed to set up two of its weapons on the pier, but intense enemy fire forced a withdrawal.



7 August – Landings Gavutu

- Crane and about 30 men had gone ashore but the intensity of resistance made withdrawal inevitable.
- Crane succeeded in reembarking all wounded and all but 12 of the able survivors.
- The boats withdrew, some to Gavutu where they reported the event, and others direct to ships where the wounded were put aboard.
- Crane and Lieutenant Smith, leader of the 2d Platoon, and the remainder of the dozen men made their way around the beach and over the causeway to arrive at Miller's Gavutu command post about midnight.
- At 2200, hearing of the failure at Tanambogo, General Rupertus requested an additional combat team and Vandegrift released the remaining two battalions of the Division Reserve.



7 August – New Guinea, Sea

- **As darkness fell** on 7 August, the American submarine S 38, ten days out from Brisbane and on patrol in St Georges Channel reported by radio "two destroyers and three larger ships of unknown type" proceeding south-easterly.
- On 7th August Admiral Turner requested Admiral McCain to send a Catalina reconnaissance aircraft north-west from Espiritu Santo via Malaita, even though it would cover part of the search area for which MacArthur's land-based aircraft were responsible.
- **At midnight** on the 7/8th August S38 intercepted a transport and two escorts off Cape St George, New Ireland, and sank the 5,628 GRT transport, Meiyo Maru, with two torpedo hits.



S38 1,062 tons, 220 feet loa, crew 42. Commissioned May 1923.

7 August – New Guinea, Air

- The DC2 was again active over Kagi with a successful drop **in the morning**, a second mission to Kagi at 12.50 failed due to bad weather.
- 32 P400s of the 35th Fighter Group crossed the Owen Stanleys in a mission aimed at enemy supply dumps in the Kokoda area. The 16 fighters equipped with bomb racks dropped 500 pound bombs and expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition, while the others remained overhead providing top cover.



USAAF P-400 of 80th Fighter Squadron
"Headhunters", 8th Fighter Group

7 August - Air

- 13 B-17's of 19th Bomb Group, out of 16 dispatched, led by Lt Col Richard Carmichael, hit Vunakanau Airfield at Rabaul, in coordination with the Marine landings on Guadalcanal, dropping 46,000 pounds of bombs and claiming a number of aircraft destroyed on Vunakanau aerodrome.
- One of the Fortresses was shot down by fighters but the American crews claimed seven Japanese aircraft shot down.
- Ten medium bombers (B-26) and three Catalinas attacked Lae, and
- a B-17 and a B-25 each attack a submarine in the Gulf of Papua.



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL 013485

UNITED STATES WAR CORRESPONDENTS INTERVIEW
LT. COL. RICHARD CARMICHAEL, 27 YEAR OLD
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE FLYING FORTRESS
FORMATION THAT RECENTLY CARRIED OUT TWO
SUCCESSFUL NIGHT ATTACKS AGAINST RABAUL.

7 August – Air, Milne Bay

- Kittyhawks took off from Milne Bay on 7th August to attempt the interception of enemy aircraft reported over Samarai. Through inexperience five pilots of 76 Squadron were airborne so long in their search for the enemy that they were forced by fuel shortage to land on an emergency strip on Goodenough Island, 57 miles to the north across Ward Hunt Strait. One aircraft crashed on landing and had to be written off. Until they could be brought off the island the five pilots were kept supplied with rations dropped from the air.
- On 7th August the second Battalion of 43rd US engineer regiment arrived at Milne Bay with modern equipment and the construction of further air strips became possible. No. 2 Strip construction and use would require considerable bridge-building and one company of the American troops was put to work on the preparation of No. 3 Strip, sited to the east of No. 1 with the runway laid out in a west-north-westerly direction from the bay-front.

7 August - Air


- On 7th August, only three days after Kenney took command, MacArthur requested authority for the formation of an American air force which, he suggested, should be designated the Fifth Air Force.



General George Kenney (center) with commanding general of V Bomber Command General Kenneth Walker and Colonel Carmichael (left), at Port Moresby, New Guinea (1942)


7 August – Air, Aleutians

- 3 B-24's dispatched to bomb Kiska return with their bombs due to solid overcast.
- Four more B-24's also depart for Kiska. 1 turns back with mechanical trouble, the others abort mission over tgt due to undercast.
- 1 B-24, 4 P-38's and an LB-30 fly 2 air coverage missions at Nazan Bay for Navy tenders.



7/8 August - Guadalcanal

- At 2200 on 7 August, Vandegrift issued his attack order for the following day.
- Plans had been changed. Since Mount Austen was out of reach, and because only 10,000 troops were available in the Lunga area, he ordered an occupation of the airfield and establishment of a defensive line along the Lunga River.
- Positions east and southeast of Red Beach would be maintained temporarily to protect supplies and unloading until shore party activities could be established within the new perimeter.



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7/8 August - Guadalcanal


- Logistical difficulties had arisen early.
- Movement of supplies from the landing craft to the beaches and then to supply dumps soon began to snarl. Marine planners had foreseen a dangerous shortage of man power at this point, but under the uncertain circumstances on this hostile beach they felt they could allot no more men to the job than the 500 from Colonel George Rowan's 1st Pioneer Battalion.
- Vandegrift did not want working parties to cut the strength of his fighting units to a level which might risk getting them defeated.
- The situation became so bad during the night of 7-8 August that the landing force had to ask the ships to stop unloading.
- There had been air attacks that afternoon, and more were expected on the 8th. The exhausted workers needed time to clear the beaches and spread out the gear, so it would be less of a target.



Red Beach at 1500 on 8 August (D+1), hopelessly blocked due to the untimely initiation of general unloading of cargo before troops ashore were prepared to receive it.

7/8 August - Tulagi

- During darkness, four separate attacks struck the raider lines.
- **The first attack**, which met with some initial success, hit between Companies C and A. Outposts fell back to the main line of resistance (MLR), and the two companies were forced apart.
- The attack isolated Company C from the rest of the battalion, but the company was not molested again.
- Company A refused its right flank and awaited developments. They were not long in coming. Shifting the direction of his attack toward his right front, the enemy attempted to roll back Walt's men from the refused flank. But the flank held, killing 26 Japanese within 20 yards of the MLR.
- That ended the concerted attacks of the night.
- Thereafter, enemy efforts consisted entirely of attempts at quiet infiltration of the Marine positions. Individuals and small groups worked from the ravine through the raider lines and launched five separate small-scale attacks against the command post, between 0030 and 0530.
- These were repulsed, and efforts on the part of two other enemy groups to skirt the beach flanks of Companies D and C likewise were turned back.



7 August

- The Marines had landed on Guadalcanal and were poised to take the airfield, the primary object of the campaign.
- The fighting on Tulagi and Gavutu still raged but no one doubted their swift recapture from an isolated garrison.
- The three carriers had conducted 704 take offs and 686 landings.
- The three fighter squadrons had lost fifteen out of ninety four Wildcats. Nine shot down, five ditched or crashed and another jettisoned. Another five were badly damaged.
- Of the eighteen which had made contact with the enemy nine or 50% had been shot down.
- Worse still they had not prevented the bombers from attacking the ships.
- Fighter direction had allocated too few fighters, kept them too low and failed to concentrate the few they had sent.
- What would happen if the defence performance was the same tomorrow but the Japanese aim was better?